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Cal.

holic Beverage Control Appeals Board,
Cal., 81 Cal.Rptr. 241, 459 P.2d 657, it
is my opinion that the prohibition in section 24755.1 against license suspension or
revocation is unconstitutional because it
limits and impairs the constitutional power
to suspend or revoke licenses granted the
Department by the second sentence of, the
fifth paragraph of section 22 of article
XX. I further conclude that since the
provisions of section 24755.1 are clearly
inseverable, the entire section is inoperative. The licensee's argument that the
section has vitality here must therefore
fall.
I would affirm the decision of the Department.

TOBRINER,

J., concurs.

Rehearing denied; TOBRINER and
SULLIVAN, JI., dissenting.
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81 Ca1.Rptr. 264
The PEOPLE, Plalnllff and Respondent,

v.
Roland TIJERINA, Defendant

and Appellant.
Cr. 1.3547.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Oct. 24, 1969.

Appeal from order of the Los Angeles
County Superior Court, Patrick Coleman,
Court Commissioner, J. Pro Tem., revoking
probation and from judgments of conviction
of grand theft and petty theft with a prior
felony conviction. The Supreme Court,
Traynor, C. J., held, inter alia, that the order revoking the probation of defendant
was void on the ground that no stipulation
was entered into permitting court commis-

sioner, who revoked the probation, to act as
a temporary judge in the case.
Order revoking probation reversed,
judgment of conviction affirmed, and appeal from order denying new trial dismissed
Opinion vacated, CaI.App., 77 CaI.Rptr.

82.
I. Larceny ¢:::359

Absent proof that price charged by
retail store from which merchandise is
stolen does not accurately reflect value
of the merchandise in the retail market,
that price is sufficient to establish the value
of the merchandise within meaning of Penal
Code. West's Ann.Pen.Code, §§ 484, 487,
487, subd. 1.
2. Larceny P62(2)
In grand theft prosecution, the evidence, including testimony of a store security officer that he was informed when
someone had permission to remove mer-

chandise and that he had not been told that
defendant had such permission, was sufficient to establish that merchandise in
question was taken by defendant without
consent of the department store.
3. Jury P29(6)

Where defendant was represented by
an attorney at both the preliminary hearing,
and at trial, where defendant was carefully
questioned before his waiver of a jury
trial was accepted, and where he stated that
he knew what a jury trial was and was
also told that "That is when twelve people
sit over here in the box and hear all the evidence," the court was not required to further explain to defendant the significance
of his waiver of a jury trial
4. CrImInal Law PI023(13)

Order denying a new trial is not appealable.
5•. CrImInal Law $=>1201
Penal Code section which provides for
an increased penalty based on a prior felony
conviction is not unconstitutional. West's

Ann.Pen.Code, § 667.
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6. Larceny *'>12

Failure of defendant, who was appI ehended in department store after he had
taken a paper hag from his pocket and put
a cashmere coat into it, to successfully re·
move the coat from the store dig not render
the theft incomplete. West's Ann.Pen.
Code, § 667.
7. Criminal Law *,>1023(12)

Order 'revoking probation was appealable as an "order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party".
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1237, suhd. 2.
8. Criminal Law ®:>982.9(6)

Order revoking the probation of defendant was void on the ground that no
stipulation was entered into permitting
court commissioner, who revoked the probation, to act as a temporary judge in the
case. West's Ann.Const. art. 6, § 21;
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1237, subd. 2;
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 259a, subd. 4;
Ca!.Rules of Court, rule 244.

Richard H. Levin, Los Angeles, under
appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E.
James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mark A. Ivener, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
John D. Maharg, County Counsel, Edward H. Gaylord, Asst. County Counsel,
and Jean Louise Webster, Deputy County
Counsel, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice.
In these appeals defendant challenges
judgments and orders entered against him
in three cases on January 31, 1968. A court
commissioner acted as a temporary judge 1
in all three cases. In No. A-ZZ0328 and No.
A-226235 the commissioner acted pursuant
to stipulation of defendant and counsel and
I. Article VI of the California' Constitution was amended in 1966 to substitute
the phrase "temporary judge" for Ujudge
pro tempore." (I 21 superseding former
459 P.2d--43Va

appointment by the court, and no contention is made that he was not empowered to
act in those cases. In No. 307540, however,
no stipulation was entered into authorizing
the commissione~ to act, and his order revoking probation in that case is challenged
on that ground.
In No. A-ZZ0328 defendant was found
gnilty of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, suhd.
1) and sentenced to prison for the term prescribed by law. He appeals from the judgment.
By stipulation the case was submitted on
the transcript of the preliminary hearing.
Joe Mena, a security agent for the Broadway Department Store, was told that on
several successive Monday nights between
7 :30 and 8 a person entered the store with
a box on his head or on his shoulders. On
Monday evening, March ZI, 1967, Mena saw
defendant walk through the store and use a
stairway marked 'fEmployees Only." Mena
alerted his partner, Walter Johnson. About
35 minutes later they saw defendant leaving
the store with a large box on his head. As
they followed, defendant looked back in
their direction, dropped the box, and started
to run. After a three or four minute chase,
Mena and Johnson caught him. The box
contained 46 packages of men's undershorts
priced at $5 a package, two sweaters priced
at $20 each, and one sweater priced at $16.99. The box also contained 13 men's sport
shirts and 17 packages of undershorts, the
price of which does not appear.
[1] Defendant contends that the retail
price of the property does not establish
its "reasonable and fair market value"
(Pen.Code, § 484) and that the evidence is
therefore insufficient to support a conviction of grand theft for the taking of property worth more than $ZOO. (Pen. Code, §
487, subd. 1.) In the absence of proof,
however, that the price charged by a retail
store from which merchandise is -stolen does
not accurately reflect the value of ~he mer• 5; .see Proposed Revision (1966), Cal.
Constitution Revision Com., p. 98; 1967
Report of Judicial Council, pp. 89--90.)
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chandise in the retail market, that price is
sufficient to establish the value of the mer·
chandise within the meaning of sections 484
and 487. (People v. Cook (1965) 233 Cal.
App.2d 435, 438, 43 Ca1.Rptr. 646.)

[2] Defendant also contends that the
evidence is insufficient to establish that the
merchandise was taken without the consent
of the department store. There is no merit
in this contention. One of the security officers testified that he was informed when
someone had permission to remove meorchandise and that he had not been told that
defendant had such permission. Moreover,
the manDer of the taking, defendant's dropping the box on being discovered, his flight,
and the absence of a sales slip are also
evidence of lack of consent.

[3]

Defendant asserts that his waiver

of the right to a jury trial was ineffective,

on the ground that he was not told that
a jury's verdict must be unanimous. De·
fendant was represented by an attorney at
both the preliminary hearing and at the
trial, and he was carefully questioned be·
fore his waiver of a jury trial was accepted." He stated that he knew what a
2. "MISS FRIEDENBERG [Deputy District Attorney]: Mr. Tijerina, you understand that in this case now before the
Court, No. A 220328, you're entitled to a
jury trial to determine your guilt or innocence in this matter, .and you're also
entitled to a jury trial to determine whether the prior felony convictions that have
been alleged are true or false; do you understand that'l
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: Do you
know what a jury trial is?
HTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: That is
when twelve people sit over here in the
box and hear all the evidence.
"You can. give up your right to the jury
trial and have the judge sitting alone determine all the issues in this case. What
is your desire? Do you want a court trial
or a jury trial?
"THE DEFENDANT: Court trial.
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: All right.
You waive your right to jury trial at this
time on all the issues?
''THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"MRS. KIPPEN [Deputy Public Defender]: Join in the waiver.

jury trial was, and he was also told that
"That is when twelve people sit over here
in. the box 'and hear all the evidence." Under these circumstances, the court was not
required to explain further to defendant the
significance of his waiver of a jury trial.
(People v. Langdon (1959) 52 Cal.2d 425,
432,341 P.2d 303; People v. Golston (1962)
58 Cal.2d 535, 538-539, 25 Cal.Rptr. 83, 375
P.2d 51; People v. Lookadoo (1967) 66 Cal.
2d 307, 311, 57 Ca1.Rptr. 608, 425 P.2d 208.)

[4] In No. A-226235 defendant was
found guilty of petty theft with a prior
conviction of a felony. (Pen.Code, § 667.)
His motion for a new trial was denied, and
he was sentenced to prison for the term
prescribed by law. He appeals from the
order denying his motion for new trial and
from the judgment. The appeal from the
order must be dismissed. (People v. Ing
(1967) 65 Cal.2d 603, 614, 55 Ca1.Rptr. 902,
422 P.2d 590; Pen.Code, § 1237.)
By stipulation the case was submitted on
the transcript of the preliminary hearing
and the superior court file of the prior con·
viction (No. 307540) of an assault with a
deadly weapon. (Pen.Code, § 245.)
UMISS FRIEDENBERG: People join
in the waiver.
"Mr. Tijerina, it has also been suggested
that we submit the case, particularly with
regard to count 2, [the grand theft charge]
on the basis of the testimony that was
given at the preliminary hearing. Do
you remember being present at the preliminary hearing?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: You remember your attorney cross~examining the
witnesses who testified against you?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: Now if we
submit it to the judge on the transcript,
this meaIlS he just reads the testimony
of the witnesses who testified and considers that evidence in arriving at his decision. Is this procedure agreeable with
you?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.
"MISS FRIEDENBERG: This means
that the witnesses won't again come into
court and be sworn and testify.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"MISS' FRIEDENBERG: AU right."
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Shortly after the closing hour on October
12, 1967, a saleslady at the J. W. Robinson
Department Store saw defendant looking at
merchandise. The next day a pile of merchandise was discovered by a store detective
on a platform next to a stairway restricted
to emergency use by eRlployees. A stakeout was ordered. Shortly after noon, defendant arrived, took a paper bag from his
pocket, and put a cashmere coat from the
pile of merchandise into the bag. He was
apprehended in the store. He did not have
a sales slip for -the coat, which was on sale
for $88, and he had not been given permission to take it or any of the merchandise
in the pile.
Defendant claims that he did not effectively waive his right to a jury trial. He
personally waived his right to a jury trial
in this case the day after he waived his
right to a jury trial in No. A-220328. Although the inquiry at the time of the waiver
was more limited 3 than that in No. A220328, our holding in that case also applies here.
[5] Defendant contends that section 667
of the Penal Code 4 is unconstitutional in
providing for an increased penalty based on
a prior felony _conviction. It is settled,
however, that section 667 and similar statutes are not unconstitutional. (People v.
Dutton (1937) 9 Ca1.2d 505, 507, 71 P.2d
218; People v. Biggs (1937) 9 Cal.2d 508,
512,71 P.2d 214; People v. Quiel (1945) 68
3. "THE COURT: Commissioner Coleman
is available for the trial of this ease.
"Mr. Tijerina, do you waive your right
to a jury trial and consent to be tried by
Commissioner Coleman rather than by a
jury?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your HOJ1~
or.
I
"THE COURT: ,You are entitled ~
have a judge of the Superior Court presid~
over your court trial. Do you waive that
right and consent that the commissioner,
Commissioner Coleman, hear the matter
rather than a Superior Court judge?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"MR. FISCHER [Deputy Public Defender]: Counsel waives, also.
"THE COURT: People waive?

Cal.
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Cal.App.2d 674, 680, 157 P.2d 446; People v.
Collins (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 295, 301, 342
P.2d 370.)
[6] . Defendant maintains that the theft
was not completeJ}}u ,the ground that he did
not succeed in removing the coat from the
store. Unlike the defendant in People
v. Meyer (1888) 75 Cal. 383, 17 P. 431,
who attempted to steal an overco~t that was
~hained to a clothing store dummy, defendant reduced the cashmere coat to his possession. ·His subsequent failure to remove
the coat from the store did not render the
theft incomplete. (People v. Quiel, supra,
68 CaI.App.2d 674, 679, 157 P.2d 446; People v. Dukes (1936) 16 Ca1.App.2d 105, 108109,60 P.2d 197.)
[7] In No. 307540 defendant pleaded
guilty to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.
Code, § 245). On March 28, 1966, he was
sentenced to prison for the term prescribed
by law, but execution of sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for
two years on condition that he spend the
first 90 days in jail. As pointed out above,
the file in this case was presented to the
commissioner on January 31, 1968, to prove
defendant's prior conviction as an element
of the crime charged in No. A-226235. Defendant does not challenge the 1966 judgment or the order granting probation in No.
307540. His attack is on the commissioner's
revocation of probation in that case. Defendant requested a continuance of three to
"MR. GERAGOS [Deputy District At·
torney] : Yes, I will waive and join in
that stipulation.
"THE COURT: This is going to be
submitted on the transcript?
"MR. FISCHER: Yes, your Honor.
"THE COURT: No additional testimony?
"MR. FISCHER: No."
4. "Every person who, having been convicted of any felony either in this State or

elsewhere, and having served a term therefor in any penal institution or having
been imprisoned therein as a condition of
probation for such offense, commits petty
theft after such conviction, is punishable
therefor by imprisonment in the county
jail not exceeding one year or in the State
prison not exceeding five years."
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four weeks to obtain private counsel to
represent him in the probation revocation
proceedings. The temporary judge denied
the motion for continuance, revoked probation, and ordered into effect the original
1966 sentence of imprisonment in the state
prison for the term prescribed by law. The
order is erroneously labelled a judgment,
and defendant's notice of appeal states that
it is from the judgment entered against him
in No. 307540 on January 31, .1%8. The
order is appealable, however, as ~ 'Iorder
made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party" (Pen. Code, §
1237, suhd. 3, now subd. 2), and defendant's
notice of appeal will be construed to refer
to it. (People v. Robinson (1954) 43 Cal.2d
143, 145,271 P.2d 872.)
(8) Defendant contends that the order
is void on the ground that no stipulation
was entered into permitting the commissioner to act as a temporary judge in the
case in which it was entered. We agree
with this contention.
As revised in 1966, section 21 of article
VI of the California Constitution provides:
"On stipulation of the parties litigant the
court may order a cause to be tried by a
temporary judge who is a ~ember of the
5. Section 5 of article VI, as it read prior
to 1966, provided:
"Upon stipulation of the parties litigant or their attorneys of record a cause
in the superior court or in a municipal
court may be tried by a judge pro tempore
who must be a member of the bar sworn
to try the cause, and who shall be empowered to aet in such capacity in the
cause tried before him until the final determination thereof. The selection of such
judge pro tempore shall be subject to
the approval and order of the court in
which said cause is pending and shall also
be subject to such regulations and orders
as may be prescribed by the Judicial
Council"
6. Rule 244. Selection, qualification and
trial by judge pro tempore.
U(a) The stipUlation of parties litigant
that a case may be tried by a judge pro
tempore shall be in writing and shall set
out in full the name and office address

State Bar, sworn and empowered to act
til final determination of the cause."

un~

The purpose -of the Constitution Revision
Commission in proposing this revision was
to restate the substance of the existing
section (then art. VI, § 5)' concisely in
modern terms (see~Proposed Revision, su~
pra, fn. 1, p. 98; Estate of Soforenko
(1%8) 260 CaLApp.2d 765, 766, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 563) and to extend the authority
to use temporary judges to justice courts.
(See 1967 Judicial Council Report. p. 89.)
Both before and after the 1966 revision of
article VI, however, a stipulation of the
parties was constitutionally required for one
not occupying the office of judge to serve
as a temporary judge. (In re Chapman
(1956) 141 CaLApp.2d 387, 390, 295 P.2d
573; In re Wales (1957) 153 CaLApp.2d
117, 119, 315 P.2d 433.) To the extent that
Martin v. Martin (1%3) 215 Cal.App.2d
338, 339, 30 CaLRptr. 293, is to the contrary,
it is disapproved.
There is nothing in Code of Civil Pro~
cedure, section 259a, subdivision 4 or in
rule 244. of the California Rules of Court
contrary to our conclusion herein. Subdivision 4 of section 259a authorizes any
court commissioner in Los Angeles County
to act as a temporary judge "when other.of the member of the State Bar agreed
upon to act as judge pro tempore, and
shall be submitted to the presiding judge.
or to the judge in whose department the
case is pending in courts which do not
have a presiding judge. If the member
of the State Bar agreed upon consents
so to act and if his selection is approved
by the judge. the approval and order
designating the person selected as judge
pro tempore shall be endorsed upon the
stipulation, which shall thereupon be filed.
The judge pro tempore so selected shall
take and subscribe the oath of office,
which shall be attached to the stipulation
and order of approval, and the case shall
thereupon be assigned to said judge pro
tempore for trial. At any time after the
filing of the oath, the judge pro tempore
may proceed with the hearing, trial and
determination of the case.
"(b) Subdivision (a) of this rule does
not apply to the selection of a court commissioner to act as a judge pro tempore."

PEOPLE T. TIJERINA

Cal.

685

Cite as 459 P.2d 680

wise qualified so to act and when appointed

for that purpose." Rule 244 sets forth the
procedure for appointing a member of the

State Bar to act as a temporary judge and
excepts from its requirements the selection
of a court commissioner to act as a tern·
porary judge. Neither the rule nor the
statute purports to authorize a court commissioner to act as, a temporary judge if
he is not "otherwise qualified $0 to ,act,"
and in the absence of a stipulation of the
parties, he is not so qualified.

anes probationary period expired on March
28, 1968, no orde~ pi revocation can now be

made (In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343,
346-347,62 Cal.Rptr. 1,431 P2d 625.)
In No. 307540, the order revoking probation is reversed.

In No. A-220328, the judgment is affirmed.
In No. A-226235,' the appeal from the
order denying a new_, trial is dismissed, and
the judgment is affirmed.

Since there was no stipulation authorizing

judge in No. 307540, the order revoking pro-

McCOMB,
PETERS, TOBRINER,
MOSK, BURKE, and SULLIVAN, JI.,

bation must ·be reversed. and since defend-

concur.

the commissioner to act as' a· temporary

